PuppetDroid: A User-Centric UI Exerciser for Automatic Dynamic Analysis
  of Similar Android Applications by Gianazza, Andrea et al.
PuppetDroid: A User-Centric UI Exerciser for Automatic
Dynamic Analysis of Similar Android Applications
Andrea Gianazza
Politecnico di Milano
andrea.gianazza@mail.polimi.it
Federico Maggi
Politecnico di Milano
federico.maggi@polimi.it
Aristide Fattori
Univ. degli Studi di Milano
joystick@security.di.unimi.it
Lorenzo Cavallaro
Royal Holloway Univ. of London
lorenzo.cavallaro@rhul.ac.uk
Stefano Zanero
Politecnico di Milano
stefano.zanero@polimi.it
ABSTRACT
Popularity and complexity of malicious mobile applications
are rising, making their analysis difficult and labor intensive.
Mobile application analysis is indeed inherently different from
desktop application analysis: In the latter, the interaction of
the user (i.e., victim) is crucial for the malware to correctly
expose all its malicious behaviors.
We propose a novel approach to analyze (malicious) mobile
applications. The goal is to exercise the user interface (UI)
of an Android application to effectively trigger malicious
behaviors, automatically. Our key intuition is to record and
reproduce the UI interactions of a potential victim of the
malware, so as to stimulate the relevant behaviors during
dynamic analysis. To make our approach scale, we automati-
cally re-execute the recorded UI interactions on apps that are
similar to the original ones. These characteristics make our
system orthogonal and complementary to current dynamic
analysis and UI-exercising approaches.
We developed our approach and experimentally shown that
our stimulation allows to reach a higher code coverage than
automatic UI exercisers, so to unveil interesting malicious
behaviors that are not exposed when using other approaches.
Our approach is also suitable for crowdsourcing scenarios,
which would push further the collection of new stimulation
traces. This can potentially change the way we conduct dy-
namic analysis of (mobile) applications, from fully automatic
only, to user-centric and collaborative too.
1. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Android devices [16] make them a very
attractive target [30, 8]. Although a wide range of threats
have been spotted in the wild, the typical vector is a malicious
app distributed through official or unofficial markets. Once
installed, these apps perform actions without the victim’s
consent, ending up in financial loss or information stealing.
Security companies, researchers [37], and practitioners agree
that there is an increasing trend, which indicates that cyber
criminals consider malicious apps a viable business1.
To develop detection and defensive countermeasures, un-
derstanding how Android malware works is essential. After
having ported the main program-analysis techniques (e.g.,
dynamic analysis, static analysis, symbolic execution) to the
1http://cwonline.computerworld.com/t/8652955/
807570490/619941/0/
Android platform, we are now hitting their well-known limi-
tations: Dynamic analysis has scarce code coverage, static
analysis is hindered by obfuscation, and symbolic execution
is resource intensive. Dynamic analysis of mobile applica-
tions is particularly difficult because of the highly interactive
nature of mobile user interfaces (UI). A malicious Android
application that is not properly exercised may not expose its
malicious behavior at all.
As overviewed in Section 2 and 7, state-of-the-art dy-
namic analysis approaches rely either on program analysis
(e.g., backward slicing) or stress-test tools (e.g., Monkey)
to increase code coverage. However, none of the current
approaches take into account how the UI is exercised by end
users. To take dynamic analysis one step further, we believe
that a radically different approach should be pursued. In
this paper we propose a new approach to exercise the UI
of an Android application that changes the way malware
analysis experiments are currently conducted, and effectively
stimulate potentially malicious behaviors.
The key intuition is to leverage human-driven UI exer-
cising. We first show that human users are more effective
at exercising an application than automatic tools because
they understand the semantic of the UI elements, and can
exercise the application accordingly. However, the number
of human resources required would be unreasonably large.
Therefore, to downsize this blocking requirement, we leverage
a second key observation: many malware samples are similar
to each other, for two reasons. First, both AV vendors [8, 29]
and research work showed that malware authors repackage
existing malware samples rather than creating brand-new
families [19, 23, 10]. As a result, there exist many instances
of the same variant. Secondly, miscreants hide malware
inside well-known, paid apps and distribute them free of
charge to fool unaware users [31, 35, 15]. Therefore, it is
common to find the same benign application used to hide
many malicious payloads. We leverage these two sources
of similarity to make our approach scale: Our idea is to
record a trace of the human-driven UI stimulation, which we
name stimulation trace, performed during a test, and then
leverage the UI similarity to automatically re-execute this
trace on applications similar to one originally tested by the
user. In this way, if at least one user in our system succeeds
in manually stimulating a malicious behavior in a malware
(or in a benign application that hides malware), it is quite
likely that, by re-using the same stimulation trace on similar
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applications, we can exercise similar (malicious) behaviors.
We design and implement PuppetDroid, an Android environ-
ment that supports both manual application testing (through
a physical device or an emulator), to collect new stimulation
traces, and automatic application exercising, which cleverly
leverages previously recorded UI stimulation traces. Puppet-
Droid relies on the screenshots of an app to find similar apps,
indexed using a fast metric known as perceptual hashing.
To evaluate PuppetDroid, first, we experimentally verified
that manual exercising allows to stimulate malicious behav-
iors better than automatic techniques. Second, we validated
our approach on 7,000 applications and found out that it
can stimulate 12–24% more behaviors than state-of-the-art
techniques. Interestingly, our system is able to unveil those
corner behaviors that are difficult to exercise with a fully
automatic approach (i.e., download an APK and execute it).
Then, we show that our UI similarity technique is precise,
scales, and has modest resource requirements. In summary:
• we propose a novel and orthogonal approach to exercise
more behaviors during dynamic analysis of (malicious)
mobile applications. Our approach is the first that
takes the end users into play.
• We propose an original method to automatically ex-
ercise the UI of an unknown application re-using UI
stimulation traces obtained from previously analyzed
applications that present a similar layout.
• We implemented and evaluated our approach to demon-
strate its feasibility and, more importantly, its effective-
ness. Remarkably, we manually verified the outcome
of each experiment.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Many approaches have been proposed to analyze appli-
cations with the final goal of designing effective detection
criteria [32, 17, 24, 6, 28, 38, 35, 14, 22]. To this end, program-
analysis techniques used for traditional malware have been
ported to Android (e.g., dynamic analysis, static analysis,
taint tracking, symbolic execution), with their well-known,
symmetric pros and cons. Static approaches can be hin-
dered by obfuscated code, repackaging or dynamic payloads,
two techniques widely used by modern malware. Symbolic
execution (e.g., [33]) is promising yet resource intensive.
In spite of its efficiency and semantic richness, the main in-
herent limitation of dynamic analysis is its inability to obtain
satisfactory code coverage: Dynamic analysis can examine
the actions performed in an execution path only if that path
is actually explored. This problem is particularly concerning
because if a malware sample is not properly exercised, it may
not expose its malicious behavior at all. Exercising mobile ap-
plications in a proper way, however, is not trivial, because of
the highly interactive UI, which makes automatic exercising
even harder than in conventional desktop scenarios.
State-of-the-art dynamic analysis approaches (e.g., [24])
incorporate automatic code-exercising and stimulation tech-
niques. Other approaches leverage stress-test tools (e.g.,
Monkey [13]) or program analysis (e.g., SmartDroid [34],
ActEVE [2]). Stress-test tools rely on pseudo-random gener-
ation of UI input events, which is simple to implement, but
rather ineffective, since randomly stimulating UI elements
displayed on the screen can hardly reproduce the typical
usage of users. Approaches such as SmartDroid leverage
static analysis to reconstruct the semantic of UI elements on
the screen, and to find execution paths that expose malicious
behaviors. Unfortunately, static analysis is ineffective against
obfuscated samples, and the research tools will need a major
upgrade with the introduction of new Android 4.4 runtime.
From our overview of the state of the art and related
work in Section 7, we notice that previous work does not
consider how the UI is exercised by a user. Interestingly,
our experiments in Section 5.1 confirm our intuition that
a human user is able to exercise certain behaviors that the
state of the art code stimulation approach [24] fail to unveil.
Given the above motivations, we conclude that to take
dynamic analysis of Android applications a step further, we
need an orthogonal approach to stimulate the UI.
3. GOALS AND APPROACH OVERVIEW
Our first goal is to provide a sandboxed environment to
safely perform manual tests on malicious applications and,
at the same time, record user interaction with the UI of the
application. Our second goal is to automatically exercise un-
known applications, leveraging stimulation traces previously
recorded on similar applications.
Our approach is to let applications run on a remote sandbox
while users seamlessly interact with their UI as if they were
running locally on their devices. More precisely, in Phase 1
(Recording of stimulation traces), each sandbox uses
a remote framebuffer protocol to collect stimulation traces,
which represent the sequence of UI events performed by the
user, as well as the list of UI elements actually stimulated
during the test. Differently from previous work (e.g., [12]),
we go beyond recording raw events from /dev/input and
re-injecting them to another input device: We correlate
such events to the respective UI elements (e.g., buttons,
or other view objects), and collect information about the
behaviors exhibited by the exercised applications, through
dynamic analysis. As described in Section 4, this entails
some challenges that we need to solve. From hereinafter,
a behavior is a sequence of observable runtime events (e.g.,
system calls, API calls).
Manual stimulation on large datasets is clearly unfeasi-
ble. Thus, in Phase 2 (Re-execution of stimulation
traces), we leverage the collected stimulation traces to au-
tomatically exercise new applications, so as to increase the
code covered during dynamic analysis. Our hypothesis is
that by re-using stimulation traces we obtain better results
(in terms of discovered behaviors) than with random UI ex-
ercisers. A na¨ıve approach where we blindly try to exercise
an application with every stimulation trace in our system
is not accurate or efficient. Therefore, in Phase 3 (Find-
ing Similar Applications), we leverage the concept of UI
application similarity. As summarized by the workflow in
Figure 1, when a new sample is to be analyzed, we first
look for similar (or equivalent) samples for which we have
a stimulation trace. Then, we use only stimulation traces
of the most similar known application. With our approach,
calculating the similarity between two applications takes
constant time and memory, whereas finding the most similar
application to a given one, in a database of N applications,
takes logarithmic time.
One could argue that the need of collecting a set of stimula-
tion traces large enough to be useful may limit the scalability
of our approach. However, we consider two factors. First,
our system could attract the interest not only of security
analysts, but also of normal users that want to safely try
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Figure 1: Workflow of our approach (Section 4).
potentially malicious applications they find on the web or
in alternative markets. Secondly, we can leverage the acces-
sibility of crowdsourcing services, like Amazon Mechanical
Turk, to recruit human workers and generate new stimula-
tion traces efficiently (being this a matter of engineering and
deployment, we focus on our novel approach)
4. SYSTEM DETAILS
4.1 Phase 1: Recording of stimulation traces
We record the low-level input events generated while the
user interacts with an application on his or her device. We
developed an extended VNC client and server architecture
through which this process happens transparently, with no
changes in the way users interact with the UI of an appli-
cation. For the client, we extended TightVNC, whereas we
implemented the server on top of the Fastdroid libraries2.
We translate the input events in a sequence of remote
framebuffer (RFB)3 PointerEvent or KeyEvent messages
that are sent to the VNC server. For each event, we save
the timestamp (according to the client), event_type (0 for
touch events and 1 for keys), action (0 is “up”, 1 is “down”,
2 is “move”), x_pos,y_pos coordinates on the screen, and
key_code (pressed button). Figure 2 shows an excerpt of a
sample input events file generated by the VNC server.
Two similar applications may have some subtle UI differ-
ences that can make a re-execution test fail (e.g., slightly
shifted buttons). Taking for example two distinct BaseBridge
samples4 from the Malware Genome Project [36], we notice
that the main button of the second sample is slightly shifted.
Exercising the second sample with the sequence of raw input
2https://code.google.com/p/fastdroid-vnc/
3https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6143.txt
4MD5s: 00c154b42fd483196d303618582420b89cedbf46,
73bb65b2431fefd01e0ebe66582a40e74928e053
88.178580|0|1|159|458
88.181193|0|2|159|456
88.183601|0|2|160|455
88.195368|0|0|160|455
103.787289|0|1|167|366
103.814748|0|2|167|365
103.816820|0|2|168|371
103.819672|0|0|168|371
107.938857|1|1|158
108.179822|1|0|158
112.758374|0|1|210|211
112.762422|0|2|209|210
112.819634|0|2|207|207
112.853343|0|0|207|212
155.617206|1|1|158
155.760906|1|0|158
164.920825|0|1|221|202
164.960888|0|2|220|202
164.999936|0|2|220|203
165.28386|0|0|220|205
TAP EVENTS
KEYSTROKES
Figure 2: Excerpt of a sample input events file.
events recorded on the first sample (as one would do by using,
for example, the approach in [12]), would cause an error.
To solve this, during recording we keep track of which view
object (e.g., button identifier) consumed each input event
during recording, in order to find that same view object
during re-execution. For this, we rely on the ViewServer,
which allows to “walk” the hierarchy5 of displayed objects.
More precisely, our VNC server performs the following steps
when a new input event is received:
1. Process RFB PointerEvent message.
2. Send the GET_FOCUS command to the ViewServer, to
get the name and hash code of the focused window (i.e.,
Activity).
3. Retrieve view hierarchy of the window sending DUMPQ
command to ViewServer.
4. Search view hierarchy for the deepest-rightmost view
object containing the coordinates of the input event.
5. Store the paths to the previously found view nodes.
We combine the collected information to extract the list of
paths to the views that actually consumed the touch events.
Moreover, as motivated in Phase 2, in case of touch events
we log which activity has consumed each event, and the path
to all the deepest nodes in the hierarchy that can consume
the touch event. By combining this information with the
coordinates of the touch events generated by the user we
build the sequence of view objects stimulated. We also retain
the relative position of the input event with respect to the
view object, which is useful in Phase 2.
4.2 Phase 2: Re-execution of stimulation traces
For each event in the recorded sequence, we use the view
object and ratio information (see Figure 3) to properly re-
5http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui
BUTTON
INPUT
EVENT
btn_length
btn_height
input_x
input_y
x_ratio à input_x / btn_length
y_ratio à input_y / btn_height
Figure 3: Input event relative position with respect
to view object.
3
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Figure 4: Examples of touch event management.
scale the horizontal and vertical coordinates. Then, we write
the resulting event into the /dev/input device.
We treat touch events with special care to avoid the follow-
ing rare corner case, which can occur if the view that receives
the input event is not the view that eventually consumes
it. More precisely, when a touch event is handled by the
Android Touch System [26], the Activity.dispatchTouch-
Event() method of the currently running Activity is called.
This method dispatches the event to the root view in the hier-
archy and waits for the result: If no view consumes the event,
the Activity calls onTouchEvent() in order to consume itself
the event before terminating. When a view object receives a
touch event, the View.dispatchTouchEvent() is called: This
method first tries to find an attached listener to consume the
event, calling View.OnTouchListener.onTouch(), then tries
to consume the event itself calling View.onTouchEvent(). If
neither there is a listener nor the onTouchEvent() method
is implemented, the event is not consumed and it flows back
to the parent. When a ViewGroup receives a touch event,
it iterates on its children views in reverse order and, if the
touch event is inside the view, it dispatches the event to the
child. If the event is not consumed by the child, it continues
to iterate on its children until a view consumes the event. If
the event is not consumed by any of its children, the View-
Group acts as a View and tries to consume itself the event.
Eventually, if it is not able to consume the event it sends
back to the parent. Figure 4 shows two examples of touch
events management: In the former, the event flows down
through the hierarchy, and since it is not consumed by any
view, it goes back to the Activity. In the latter, the event is
consumed by the second View child of the ViewGroup object.
Our system avoids this corner case because it recorded,
during Phase 2, which activity has consumed each event,
and the path to all the deepest nodes in the hierarchy that
can consume the touch event.
4.3 Phase 3: Finding Similar Applications
In case a stimulation trace for an application A is not
available, after searching by MD5, we rely on visual similarity
to find similar applications.
The goal of this phase is to find an application, B, for
which a stimulation trace exists, and that has a UI similar to
As. To this end we leverage the concept of visual similarity,
implemented through perceptual hashing. Given an image
in input, a perceptual hashing algorithm creates a metric
fingerprint that is robust to image re-scaling, rotation, de-
formation, skew and compression. Thus, if two images are
visually similar, their respective hashes, which are 64-bits
unsigned integers, are very close. In particular, perceptually
similar images have a hamming distance within bounds that
can be reliably estimated6, as we also show in Section 5.3.
In practice, to lookup a suitable stimulation trace for appli-
cation A, we calculate the perceptual hash of its screenshots.
Then, we look for B, an application which screenshots mini-
mize the hamming distance from A’s screenshots according
to their respective perceptual hash. We pre-calculate the
hashes of the known applications offline (which takes only
5.030453ms on average), and index them in a MVP tree [3],
which allows lookup in logarithmic time.
If a screenshot is already available, which is very likely if
the application is obtained from a market (e.g., screenshots
are part of the app’s metadata), our our system calculates
the perceptual hash using the ph_dct_imagehash function of
the libphash library. In case no screenshot is available, our
system instantiates an emulator, installs the APK of A and
leverages the screencap utility to take a screenshot once the
application has started.
4.4 Implementation Details
The actual execution of the target application happens on
the server tier, which receives the UI events, and records
and proxies them to an instrumented Android Virtual De-
vice (AVD) with the same screen size of the client. AVDs
are concurrently instantiated for each new client. A VNC
server instance is connected to each AVD screen to record
the stimulation traces. For Phase 2 the life cycle is almost
the same, with the only differences that, instead of connect-
ing VNC server, we inject the re-scaled and adapted input
events into the running AVD. The devices associated to the
touchscreen and to the keyboard are fixed and respectively
are /dev/input/event1 and /dev/input/event2.
We have tested PuppetDroid with the original AVD and
DroidBox [28]. For our experiments we obtained access to
CopperDroid7 [24], which allows automatic dynamic- and
stimulation-based behavioral analysis.
We patched the ViewServer [1] and stripped it down so
as to collect only data useful to our purposes. This resulted
in a 20–40x speedup over the original implementation.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our results shows that both manual exercising and re-
execution of collected stimulation traces reach higher code
coverage than the one obtained with automatic UI exercisers:
We succeeded in stimulating more than the amount of behav-
iors stimulated by other exercising strategies. Moreover, we
found some particular cases in which PuppetDroid succeeds
in stimulating interesting malicious behaviors that are not
exposed using automatic application exercising approaches.
In Experiment 1 we verified that our stimulation ap-
proach led to a better stimulation compared to other auto-
matic analysis approaches. For this, we compared the number
of behaviors exercised with PuppetDroid vs. the ones exer-
cised with automatic approaches (i.e., monkey) typically used
in dynamic malware analysis frameworks, and vs. the system
events stimulation strategy proposed in CopperDroid [24].
In Experiment 2 we verified that the same stimulation
trace can be reused on similar samples to exercise the same
behaviors. For this, we compared the behaviors exercised
6http://phash.org/docs/design.html
7http://copperdroid.isg.rhul.ac.uk
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on manually-stimulated APKs with the behaviors exercised
on similar samples, and verified the outcome manually. In
Experiment 3 we verified that our UI similarity approach
is accurate and efficient.
For dynamic analysis, we obtained access to the Copper-
Droid sandbox, which is convenient for our needs because
(1) works at system-call, (2) incorporates a state-of-the-art
stimulation approach, able to stimulate both statically and
dynamically registered broadcast receivers, and (3) already
provides a list of behaviors built by means of system calls.
5.1 Experiment 1: Manual UI exercising
5.1.1 Dataset
We used 15 APKs samples, 13 from the Android Malware
Genome Project [36], and 2 from the Google Play store. The
dataset is purposely small, because we performed multiple
tests on each sample and manually inspected the output of
each test in order to examine precisely the differences between
different approaches. Therefore, we preferred focusing on a
small dataset to perform a deeper analysis of each test result.
5.1.2 Experimental setup and procedure
For each sample in our dataset, we collect the system call
traces during execution with four stimulation approaches:
• NoStim: without stimulation,
• Copper: with CopperDroid stimulation strategy,
• Monkey stimulation with an increasing number of
input events (500, 1000, 2000, 5000).
• Our: an everyday Android user exercised the sample
through PuppetDroid, without knowing the outcome of
the other tests. We instructed the user to rely on his
sole knowledge and try to use the application natu-
rally, following anything the application asks, without
thinking whether the action is dangerous or not.
For each couple of stimulation approaches A and B, we
calculate the total stimulated behaviors by A and B, and the
behaviors stimulated only by either A or B (set difference). In
each test, we start a clean sandbox, install the APK sample,
run it with the selected stimulation approach, and collect
the system calls traces and the behavior lists.
5.1.3 Results
We calculated the average number of behaviors (total and
distinct) observed with each stimulation approach, and the
average number of distinct missed behaviors by each strategy
(set difference). We repeated the experiment on the entire
dataset, and then on each set of goodware and malware
applications.
Figure 5 summarizes the results. From the bar chart on the
top-left corner, we can see that the human-driven stimulation
succeeds in stimulating more behaviors than any automatic
approaches: we are able to exercise 112% of total behaviors
and 124% of distinct behaviors more than the automatic
stimulation. The same result holds regardless of whether
the application is malicious or benign. The bar chart on
the bottom-left corner confirms the above results regardless
of whether the applications are benign (striped bars) or
malicious (solid bars).
From the bar chart on the top-right corner, we can see
that the other approaches miss many behaviors with respect
1 2 3 4
Figure 6: Experiment 1 (Case analysis): Steps to
install BridgeProvider payloads: 1) Ask for applica-
tion update; 2) Install payload; 3) Restart applica-
tion; 4) Malicious service running on device.
to ours, whereas our technique misses a negligible amount of
behaviors. From another perspective, PuppetDroid is able to
stimulate 593% exclusive behaviors more in respect to monkey
and 200% more i respect to the state of the art (CopperDroid).
The bar chart on the bottom-right corner confirms the above
results regardless of whether the applications are benign
(striped bars) or malicious (solid bars). We analyze the
results on malware and goodware samples separately.
Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis that Puppet-
Droid UI stimulation approach allows to obtain better results
than automatic approaches during dynamic analysis.
Case analysis. A notable case that deserves detailed analy-
sis is that of a malicious behavior exercised, and thus exposed,
exclusively by our system. The malware sample under anal-
ysis is com.keji.danti80, belonging to BaseBridge malware
family. BaseBridge is a trojan that, once installed, prompts
the user with an upgrade dialog: if users accept to do so, the
malware will install a second malicious application on the
phone. This service communicates with a control server to re-
ceive instructions to perform unwanted activities (e.g., place
calls or send messages to premium numbers). Meanwhile,
the malware also blocks messages from the mobile carrier in
order to prevent users from getting fee consumption updates:
in this way all malicious activities are undertaken stealthily
without the users’ knowledge or consent. More details on this
malware can be found in [21, 20, 27]. This case is very com-
mon and is used by malware authors to circumvent dynamic
analysis with ineffective UI exercising.
Analyzing the sample with PuppetDroid we obtained the list
of behaviors shown in Table 1. The underlined lines indicate
a behavior that none of the other stimulation techniques
were able to reveal. The malware writes another APK file,
xxx.apk, on the filesystem. As a matter of fact, during
the test, the application prompts the user to install a new
malicious application, named BridgeProvider, to complete
the update, as shown in Figure 6.
In conclusions, other stimulation approaches did not exer-
cise the malware enough to make it reveal its true malicious
behavior, with the consequent risk to consider the sample
as safe. Instead, using PuppetDroid, the analyst is able to
detect such a potential dangerous behavior and subsequently
analyze in detail the functioning of the application.
Conclusions of Experiment 1: The results confirmed our
intuition that automatic UI stimulation approaches can only
exercise a subset of the (malicious) behaviors of a malware
during dynamic analysis. Moreover, PuppetDroid approach
based on human-driven UI exercising allows to reproduce
typical victim interaction with the malware and to reach
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Table 1: Experiment 1: List of behaviors extracted
testing com.keji.danti80 malware sample.
Hits Beh. Data
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti80/files
1 write /data/com.keji.danti80/files/xxx.apk
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
1 mkdir /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs
1 unlink /data/com.keji.danti80/files/xxx.apk
1 connect host: 10.0.2.3, retval: 0, port: 53
1 ns_query query_data: b3.8866.org. 1 1
1 connect host: 221.5.133.18, retval: -115, port: 8080
1 write /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs/first_app_perfs.xml
3 unlink /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs/first_app_perfs.xml.bak
1 write /data/com.keji.danti80/files/atemp.jpg
1 unlink /data/com.keji.danti80/files/atemp.jpg
2 write 221.5.133.18 port:8080
then higher code coverage.
5.2 Experiment 2: Automatic Re-execution
This experiment’s goal is to verify the following novel hy-
pothesis: If we succeed in exercising the (malicious) behaviors
in a sample, the same stimulation should trigger behaviors
in a similar sample.
In a preliminary experiment, we measured that the per-
centage of UI events successfully re-executed on a dataset of
similar applications is 88.52%. This percentage is actually a
conservative estimate. For example, suppose that we have a
recording of a UI stimulation with 20 events: if PuppetDroid
Table 2: Experiment 2: Summary of the results (av-
erage values per test).
a) ManualVsRe-exec
Manual test 201.85 (38.69 distinct)
Re-executed tests 230.20 (52.76 distinct)
Only in manual 24.00
Only in re-executed 25.00
c) AutomaticVsRe-exec
Stimulated Behaviors
No Stimulation 199.79 (39.73 distinct)
Monkey 196.62 (39.61 distinct)
CopperDroid 198.95 (41.84 distinct)
Our 230.20 (52.76 distinct)
Exclusive Behaviors
Only in NoStim Monkey Copper Our
Monkey 4.35 0 8.37 8.82
Copper 6.54 8.05 0 7.74
Our 23.27 22.58 22.15 0
succeeds in re-executing 10 UI events but it is not able to find
the correct view to inject the 11th event, the re-execution is
terminated. We then have a re-execution score of 50%.
In the reminder of this section we show the impact of
such re-execution on the behaviors exposed during dynamic
analysis.
5.2.1 Dataset
For this experimental evaluation we picked 13 malware
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samples from the Android Malware Genome Project [36] used
in Experiment 1, run Phase 1 to record stimulation traces,
and Phase 3 to retrieve similar APKs from a repository
of over 7,000 samples that also include Google Play and
alternative markets.
5.2.2 Experimental setup and procedure
To verify if our re-execution approach is feasible, we need
a way to evaluate the results of the re-executed tests. We
follow four criteria:
a) ManualVsRe-exec: Compare the behaviors exercised
with manual stimulation vs. the behaviors exercised
automatically.
b) Re-execBehaviors: Verify if an interesting malicious
behavior exhibited in the original sample is also exhib-
ited during the re-execution on a similar application.
c) AutomaticVsRe-exec: Compare the behaviors ex-
ercised using automatic stimulation tools, as in Ex-
periment 1, against the behaviors extracted during
execution.
We structured each test as follows, for each of the 13 APK:
1. As in Experiment 1, we ask a user to manually test
the application while PuppetDroid records UI stimula-
tion during traces.
2. Search for the most similar APK using Phase 3.
3. Run Phase 2 to automatically re-execute previously
recorded UI stimulation on the similar application.
4. Test the similar application with automatic stimulation
approaches:
• NoStim: 1 test without stimulation,
• Monkey: 20 tests using monkey,
• Copper: 1 test using CopperDroid stimulation
strategy.
5. Calculate the four evaluation criteria explained above.
For each sample in the dataset we performed one test.
5.2.3 Results
The results for a) and c) are summarized in Table 2 and
are analyzed in the reminder of this section with the aid of
Figure 7 and 8 respectively. The results for b) are analyzed
in depth with the aid of Table 3 and a set of screenshots.
ManualVsRe-exec (Figure 7). We show the compari-
son between the total and distinct number of behaviors stim-
ulated in the original, manual test vs. the average numbers
of behaviors stimulated in re-executed tests. The rightmost
plot shows the exclusive behaviors (i.e., those stimulated only
during either strategy (manual and re-execution)).
One would expect behaviors extracted in the original test
to be always more than those stimulated in re-executed tests.
In some cases, this is not true, (e.g., in Test3 ) because we are
comparing behaviors exercised in different, even if similar,
applications: it is possible that an application similar to
the one originally tested generates more behaviors even if
less stimulated. For instance, when application A starts it
generates 10 behaviors, whereas when application B, similar
to A, starts it generates 20 behaviors. The same holds also
for the UI stimulation, so clicking on a button of A we may
obtain 2 behaviors, while clicking on the same button on B
leads to 4 behaviors. Recall, however, that we are not simply
counting the exercised behaviors: In this experiment we also
evaluate which behaviors are exclusively exercised by each
strategy.
Re-execBehaviors (Table 3). A notable case is that of
a malicious behavior stimulated in the original sample, which
is exercised during the re-execution on a similar application,
too. We consider the application com.keji.danti160, be-
longing to BaseBridge malware family. We chose this sample
because during the test it showed a behavior similar to the
one shown by com.keji.danti80: when started, the applica-
tion asks the user to update it and installs a malicious service,
named BridgeProvider, on the phone. The list of behaviors
extracted during the test is presented in Table 3 (left): un-
derlined rows indicate the malicious actions executed by the
application.
Scanning our sample repository with androsim, we found
a sample, named com.keji.danti161 very similar to com-
.keji.danti160. By re-executing the UI stimulation recorded
with PuppetDroid on the application com.keji.danti161, we
extracted the list of behaviors shown in Table 3 (right):
underlined rows present the same malicious actions stimu-
lated in the original test execution. This example illustrates
that our approach can unveil behaviors hidden to otherwise
automated tests.
AutomaticVsRe-exec (Figure 8). We now evaluate
the stimulation obtained with re-execution compared with
automatic stimulation approaches. Comparing the behaviors
extracted from re-executed tests with the ones retrieved stim-
ulating the same samples with Monkey and CopperDroid,
we obtained the data shown in Figure 8. As we can see, the
re-executed stimulation still allows to stimulate more behav-
iors than automatic approaches: in fact, using PuppetDroid
re-execution, we are able to stimulate 116% of total behav-
iors and 130% of distinct behaviors more than automatic
stimulation methodologies. Moreover, with re-execution, we
stimulate 535% exclusive behaviors more than Monkey and
355% more than CopperDroid. It is also worth noting that
this is a conservative estimate of re-execution effectiveness:
as a matter of fact, our experimental data contain also cases
in which re-execution promptly failed after test beginning.
Conclusions of Experiment 2. The results support our
key intuition on the re-execution of UI stimulation traces:
we demonstrated that if (malicious) behaviors are exercised
during a manual test, it is quite likely that using the same
stimulation over the UI of similar applications will lead them
to show their behaviors during the analysis. Exercising the UI
of an application with the re-execution of stimulation traces
allows to expose more behaviors than automatic approaches.
5.3 Experiment 3: UI Similarity
This experiments’ goal is to verify that using screenshot
similarity as a mean to find apps with similar UI is a correct
hypothesis. In addition, we verify that the approach of using
perceptual hashing is time and memory efficient.
5.3.1 Dataset
We used a first dataset of screenshots that we created by
executing one app at a time in an emulator and launching
the screencap utility. We obtained 6,000 screenshots. This
procedure took about 10 seconds per app, including the time
required to install the APK. Considering that executing a full
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Figure 7: Experiment 2 (ManualVsRe-exec): Comparison of behaviors stimulated in the original, manual
execution vs. the average total and distinct behaviors stimulated in re-executed tests. The third bar graph
shows the exclusive behaviors exercised in either manual or re-executed tests.
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Table 3: Experiment 2 (Re-execBehaviors): Behaviors found on com.keji.danti160 (left) and re-executed
automatically from PuppetDroid on a similar sample (right).
Original execution Re-execution on a similar sample
Data Beh. Data Hits Beh. Blob
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name 2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name 2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name 2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti160/shared_prefs 1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti161/shared_prefs
1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti160/files 1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti161/files
1 write /data/com.keji.danti160/files/xxx.apk 1 write /data/com.keji.danti161/files/xxx.apk
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name 2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name 2 write /sys/qemu_trace/process_name
1 mkdir /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs 2 mkdir /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs
1 connect host: 10.0.2.3, retval: 0, port: 53 2 write /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_ prefs/first_app_perfs.xml
1 ns_query query_data: b3.8866.org. 1 1 1 unlink /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_ prefs/first_app_perfs.xml.bak
1 unlink /data/com.keji.danti160/files/xxx.apk 1 connect host: 10.0.2.3, retval: 0, port: 53
1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti160/databases 1 ns_query query_data: b3.8866.org. 1 1
24 write /data/com.keji.danti160/databases/db.db 1 unlink /data/com.keji.danti161/files/xxx.apk
3 write /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs/first_app_perfs.xml 1 connect host: 221.5.133.18, retval: -115, por t: 8080
2 unlink /data/com.sec.android.bridge/shared_prefs/first_app_perfs.xml.bak 1 mkdir /data/com.keji.danti161/databases
2 connect host: 221.5.133.18, retval: -115, por t: 8080 17 write /data/com.keji.danti161/shared_prefs/com.keji.danti161.xml
22 write /data/com.keji.danti160/shared_ prefs/com.keji.danti160.xml 16 unlink /data/com.keji.danti161/shared_prefs/com.keji.danti161.xml.bak
21 unlink /data/com.keji.danti160/shared_ prefs/com.keji.danti160.xml.bak 24 write /data/com.keji.danti161/databases/db.db
4 write /data/system/dropbox/drop68.tmp
dynamic analysis in an instrumented environment takes time
in the order of minutes, we consider this overhead negligible.
We used also a second dataset of 16,000 screenshots that
we obtained by crawling the blackmart8 marketplace. The
screenthots are part of each app metadata, as it happens
in the majority of marketplaces. For both the datasets we
saved the images in 8-bits JPG files at 288x480 to 319x480
8http://www.blackmartalpha.net/
square pixels (at most 221KB each).
5.3.2 Experimental setup and results
We ran our experiments on Xeon E5506 @ 2.13GHz with
6GB of RAM. We implemented Phase 3 in C++ using the
Boost UBLAS library, OpenMP, and the hamming distance
ph_hamming_distance from the pHash library. In our exper-
iments, we used 3 concurrent OpenMP threads to calculate
the sparse distance matrix.
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Table 4: Manual cluster analysis.
Random sample from 420 clusters (6,000 dataset)
Classes #clusters (%) Homogeneity (%) Avg. Size
1 (pure) 84 (85.71) 100.0 4.03
2 9 (9.1836) 67.30 5.11
3 2 (2.0408) 54.10 7.50
4 1 (1.0204) 86.10 9.00
5 1 (1.0204) 28.50 7.00
Random sample from 628 clusters (16,000 dataset)
1 (pure) 190 (85.97) 100.0 2.17
2 24 (10.86) 53.00 2.17
3 2 (0.905) 53.00 6.50
4 3 (1.358) 33.00 4.67
5 1 (0.453) 25.00 8.00
6 1 (0.453) 29.00 7.00
To verify that our approach is time and memory efficient,
we executed the ph_dct_imagehash function to calculate the
hash of each image in the our larger dataset, which resulted
in 5.030453ms on average, with a 2.172415ms standard devi-
ation and less than 5 megabytes of main memory on a single
core. As hashes can be indexed in proper data structures
(e.g., MVP trees) that take into account metric distances,
the time required to perform a k-nearest-neighbor search
(k = 1) is also negligible as it grows logarithmically with
the number of apps. We verified that the time required to
lookup a similar app is minuscule with respect to the time
required to run a full dynamic analysis.
Considered the low time and memory requirements, we
were able to cluster both the datasets with DBSCAN [9], as
demonstrated in Figure 9, and allows to further speedup the
lookup phase if necessary. Moreover, in Figure 10 we show
that the threshold on the hamming distance can be reliably
chosen in an unsupervised fashion by taking into account the
intra-cluster distance, inter-cluster distance, average cluster
size and total number of clusters. We indeed observe that
increasing the threshold above 16 (bits), the number of clus-
ters drops significantly, while the average cluster size jumps
from 2–6 elements to about half the size of the dataset. This
indicates that using a threshold below 16 allows DBSCAN
to find many small clusters, each with the similar apps, plus
one noisy cluster of unpaired apps. This is also showed by
the intra-cluster distance, which increases significantly at 16.
We chose 10 as the threshold, and 2 as the minimum cluster
size (as we want to find, at least, couples of similar apps).
In the Appendix we show that our approach can find in-
teresting, non-obvious pairs of similar apps. To validate our
approach we asked Mechanical Turk Master Qualified workers
to analyze 321 randomly picked (i.e., sort -R) clusters and
report the number and size of distinct classes of screenshots
they found in each of them. With this we calculated each
cluster’s homogeneity as the size of the most frequent class
over the cluster size. Ideally, homogeneity should be 100%,
indicating 1 class of UI per cluster, which means a pure,
perfectly formed cluster. We could not reliably use the name
nor the MD5 of the application as a class label, because, as
shown by previous work (see Section 7), many applications
are actually repackaged versions or other applications. How-
ever, by randomly drawing 100 of 420 and 221 of 628 clusters
we inspected 23.81% and 35.19% of the clusters respectively
from the 6,000 and 16,000-images datasets. As Table 4 shows,
our approach finds 85.71–85.97% pure clusters), whereas the
reminders have a reasonably high homogeneity, except for
some outliers.
Figure 9: Experiment 3: Boxplot distribution of
time (a) and memory (b) requirements (33 runs per
each N) for clustering app screenshots. Time and
memory for comparing 2 apps is always constant.
6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The presence of a very small view object in the original
sample layout that is not present in the layouts of similar
applications is a corner case that can make our re-execution
incomplete (see Appendix). For example, during the stim-
ulation of the original sample, our user clicked on a link
embedded in a TextView object. Re-executing the test on
a similar application, the content of the TextView changed,
with consequent vanishing of the link. Hence, clicking on
the TextView in the original sample led to open a new win-
dow, while the same click on the similar application did not
generate any transition, making the re-execution test fail.
To avoid this specific cases of dynamic layouts, our future
work includes attaching semantic tags to each screenshot
(e.g., list of known view objects visualized), so as to devise a
similarity criterion that can recognize whether two layouts
are very similar, yet with a significant tiny variation (e.g,
absence of a single, small button). However, this creates
the further challenge of deciding a threshold, because such
a semantic similarity criterion cannot possibly be mapped
on a metric space. Instead, our current method is simple
and practical because it requires no threshold: We find the
application that minimizes the distance, and we can do this
because the features are metric.
7. RELATEDWORK
Our work is related to dynamic analysis, similarity and UI
exercising of Android applications.
Dynamic analysis. TaintDroid [7], integrated and ex-
tended by other analysis systems such as DroidBox [28]
and Andrubis [17], extends Android to taint track privacy-
sensitive resources and notify the user if such information
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Figure 10: Experiment 3: Parameter estimation on 16,000 images. Larger versions in the Appendix.
leave the system via network, SMS, or else. Unfortunately, it
prevents third-party apps from loading native libraries, and
is version specific. DroidBox [28] extends TaintDroid with
the ability to keep track of network traffic, sent SMS, phone
calls, etc. DroidBox has recently been upgraded to APIMon-
itor, which works directly on the source code of applications
(rather than on the code of the system).
Differently from previous approaches, CopperDroid [24], is
an out-of-the-box dynamic analysis tool that relies on an in-
strumented version of the Android emulator to automatically
reconstruct behaviors. By thoroughly inspecting syscalls and
their arguments, CopperDroid performs an unified analysis
of both low level (e.g., file writes) and high level (e.g., send
an SMS) actions performed by an application. Furthermore,
it uses an effective stimulation mechanism that increases
the code coverage. Similarly, DroidScope is built on top of
QEMU. Authors modified the translation phase from An-
droid code to TCG, an intermediate representation used in
QEMU, to insert extra instructions that enable fine-grained
analyses. To reconstruct the two semantic levels of Android,
(Linux and Dalvik), VMI is leveraged.
Application Similarity. Tools such as Androguard9
assist reverse engineers in finding similar APKs, but have
accuracy and scalability issues. Therefore, research in this
direction is fairly active for different purposes. For exam-
ple, [11, 4] use app similarity to find repackaged, ad-aggressive
versions of applications distributed on alternative markets.
Juxtapp [15] recognizes whether applications contain known,
flawed code, exhibit code reuse that indicates piracy, or are
(repackaged) variants of known malicious apps. Juxtapp
focuses on scalability, proposing a similarity metric that is
suitable for map-reduce frameworks. Juxtapp requires 100
minutes of computation on 100 8-core machines with 64GB
of RAM to analyze 95,000 distinct APKs. DNADroid [5]
exploits the dependency graph to find pairs of matching
methods to recognize plagiarized applications.
PuppetDroid differs substantially from previous work be-
cause it takes the UI into account. Our goal is not that of
finding similar code, but to finding similar interfaces.
Exercising of Android applications. Dynodroid [18]
uses an “observe and execute” approach (i.e., analyze the
content of displayed UI elements and then generate tailored
random input events). Dynodroid reaches the same code
coverage obtained with Monkey, but with much less events.
SmartDroid [34] leverages static and dynamic analysis
to extract a sequence of UI events that allow to stimulate
suspicious behaviors. Static analysis is used to identify the
invocations of sensitive methods. Then, sensitive paths from
application’s entry points to identified method invocations
are built. Last, dynamic analysis is used to verify the validity
of the paths previously found.
ACTEve [2] proposes an algorithm that leverages concolic
9https://code.google.com/p/androguard/
execution [25] to automatically generate input events. It uses
advanced subsumption and pruning algorithms to avoid the
path explosion problem and, thus, is able to automatically
generate test inputs that strive the execution flow of an ap-
plication to get high code coverage. Despite its optimization,
though, the overhead of this technique is high (i.e., hours)
for malware analysis purposes.
Finally, RERAN [12] allows to record and replay low-level
UI events directly reading from, and writing on, system input
devices. This work uses an approach similar to the one used
by PuppetDroid to inject input events, but it is limited to
a mere re-execution of the original recorded touch events
without offering any analysis of application UI.
PuppetDroid differs substantially from previous work be-
cause (1) takes human users into account, (2) introduces the
concept of visual similarity and, at the same time, (3) binds
low-level input events to view objects.
8. CONCLUSION
Dynamic analysis is facing new challenges with mobile
malware. Mobile software (both goodware and malware)
was born in a radically different ecosystem than traditional
software, which includes, for instance, app marketplaces—the
main distribution channel for malicious apps.
Because of this different nature, the victim’s participation
during the infection is essential, and greater than in tradi-
tional malware. We believe that orthogonal approaches to
dynamic analysis, such as PuppetDroid, that strive to cap-
ture the user’s actions, are an important research direction
to pursue. Our experiments show that our hypotheses are
true, and that human users can be effectively and efficiently
included in the dynamic analysis workflow, also thanks to
the availability and accessibility of crowdsourcing platforms.
This can potentially change the way we conduct dynamic
analysis of mobile applications (from fully automatic, to
scalable and collaborative): We believe that our system can
attract the interest not only of security analysts but also of
normal users that want to safely test potentially malicious
applications.
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APPENDIX
Sample Output of Phase 3
We show 6 sample clusters created by our approach, which
highlight how it can find non obvious UI-similar applications.
Larger Version of Figure 10
Sample Corner Case in Phase 2
Example of re-execution failure due to the presence of par-
ticular UI elements. See Section 6.
Tap on
central button
Tap
on link
Link not found
Execution terminated
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